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I. Introduction 
Healthcare is broadly provided free at the point of delivery in England by the National Health 
Service.1 By contrast, social care (which supports people with physical, cognitive or age-related 
conditions in carrying out personal care or domestic routines) is subject to a means test that can 
include the care recipient’s home.2 One principle embodied in the Care Act 2014 is nevertheless 
the frequent undesirability of a social care recipient being forced to sell her own home during 
her lifetime to fund her care.3 It therefore seeks to increase the availability of deferred payment 
agreements (DPAs), enabling a local authority to make a secured loan to the care recipient in 
order to fund the care.4 It seems that there will be ‘situations where the local authority is 
contracting with [a] care home on the person’s behalf (and is deferring charging the person)’ 
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Act 2014 “Fair”?’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 112, 134–38. 
4 Care Act 2014, s 34–36. 
  
and also ‘situations where the person is contracting with [a] care home themselves and the local 
authority is effectively “loaning” the person money to pay their care home costs’.5 
Even if this system is beneficial to care recipients themselves (albeit in an emotional rather 
than necessarily material sense), it could have profound implications for people (to be termed 
‘(former) co-residents’) who wish to remain in the home of a now-deceased recipient. This is 
particularly true given that the secured loan facilitated by a DPA is due for repayment just 90 
days after a recipient’s death,6 and that former co-residents might be vulnerable former 
providers of informal care.7 As Hopkins and Laurie put it, the system seeks to preserve ‘the 
paradigm of housing as home’ during a care recipient’s life, but not to further ‘the paradigm of 
housing as an inheritance’.8 Former co-residents are affected by a debt owed to the state by a 
third party and borne out of necessitous circumstances, a debt that would not have arisen had 
the third party’s needs been sufficiently different to be covered by the NHS. The fact that the 
co-resident has been able to live in the property for the remainder of the care recipient’s life 
and the claim that ‘many people choose to use a deferred payment agreement as a “bridging 
loan” to give them time and flexibility to sell their home when they choose to do so’ must 
nevertheless be taken into account,9 as must the negative consequences if the social care system 
were unable to provide for those who require care but lack the means to pay for it altogether. 
This chapter aims to evaluate the relationship between former co-residents and home sales 
forced by local authorities, comparing a former co-resident’s position with that of others whose 
homes are the subject of attempted forced sale by creditors in other contexts, by examining 
law, guidance and codes of practice. The fundamental question is whether the system of DPAs 
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and related matters governed by the Care Act adequately balances the perceived societal 
interest in ensuring that those with means contribute towards their care costs and the individual 
interests of former co-residents in remaining in their own homes both before and after the death 
of a social care recipient. The chapter begins by considering the relevance of a care recipient’s 
home to the initial assessment of liability to pay for social care. Section III then analyses the 
law concerning the creation of charges on the home (including via DPAs) both before and 
under the Care Act, before the last substantive section considers the actual enforcement of debts 
and sale of homes in the context of social care. The chapter argues that while there are some 
points of concern, former co-residents are generally in a justifiably stronger position than co-
residents of private creditors, and that most prejudice is caused by the underlying policy of 
means testing for social care. 
II. The Home and Liability for Care Fees 
A. An Outline of the Social Care Funding System 
Before the details of deferred payment agreements and home sales are considered, the system 
of funding social care and financial assessment must be outlined. Under the social care system 
pre-dating the full implementation of the Care Act in England, ‘[v]ery broadly, … people with 
assets over £23,250 receive no financial state support and need to fund their own care’ and 
‘[t]he level and type of state support for people with assets below this threshold depends on 
their needs and income’.10 A care recipient’s liability to pay is assessed by a local authority 
(separately to a needs assessment)11 using an extremely complex set of regulations to determine 
the existence of relevant capital and income.12 There is currently a general obligation to charge 
when the relevant capital limits are exceeded only where care is to be provided in a care home,13 
as distinct from when it is to be provided in the care recipient’s own home. The Care Act’s 
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Impact Assessment, however, suggests that this obligation will be removed and replaced with 
a discretion to charge in both contexts when the Act is fully brought into force.14 Statutory 
guidance also plays a key role within the social care system.15 
Inter alia, the Care Act (much of which came into force in April 2015) sought to rationalise the 
provision of social care16 and to limit the amount that any one person can be expected to 
contribute towards her lifetime care costs.17 That said, the implementation of the cap on eligible 
lifetime care costs (expected to be £72,000 in the first instance where a person’s care needs had 
developed after the age of 25) has been delayed from April 201618 to April 2020.19 In addition, 
while the threshold below which means-tested help is provided was to increase to from £23,250 
to £27,000 where the person’s home was not included in the financial assessment and £118,000 
where it was included,20 there were a number of significant limitations on the cap’s effect even 
before the delay was announced,21 and many individuals will be expected to contribute a 
significant sum towards care costs even if the Act’s funding provisions are fully commenced. 
B. The Significance of ‘Disregards’ in Protecting Co-Residents 
                                                   
14Department of Health, Impact Assessment: The Care Act 2014 (Department of Health, 2014) [1.116]. 
15 Department of Health, ‘Care and Support Statutory Guidance’ (n 9). For analysis of the guidance’s legal effect, 
see B Sloan, ‘Trusts and Anti-Avoidance under the Care Act 2014’ [2015] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 
489, 499. 
16 See, eg, Care Act 2014, s 13. 
17 ibid s 15. 
18 Department of Health, The Care Act 2014: Consultation on Draft Regulations and Guidance to Implement the 
Cap on Care Costs and Policy Proposals for a New Appeals System for Care and Support (Department of Health, 
2015). 
19 Department of Health, ‘Letter from Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP: Delay in the Implementation of the Cap on Care 
Costs’ (17 July 2015), available at www.gov.uk/government/publications/delay-in-the-implementation-of-the-
cap-on-care-costs (accessed on 29 November 2016). 
20 Department of Health, The Care Act 2014: Consultation on Draft Regulations (n 18) [9.7]. 
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A fundamentally important means of protecting the care recipient’s home (and a co-resident’s 
ability to continue living in it) at the financial assessment stage must be appreciated. This is 
the fact that a home can in many cases be excluded from a local authority’s assessment of the 
care recipient’s capital in the first place. If an adult care recipient is to receive non-residential 
care in her own home, assessment of her capital must exclude her main or only home.22 Even 
if the care recipient is to receive residential care in a care home, the very presence of some of 
the co-residents with whom this chapter is concerned can prevent a home from being included 
in the local authority’s assessment from the outset, meaning that the care recipient will be 
assessed as though she did not have an interest in it for these purposes. There is a mandatory 
‘disregard’ not only if the care recipient is in a care home temporarily and intends to return to 
the main home or is taking reasonable steps to dispose of it, but also if the main home is 
occupied by a non-estranged partner, a single parent who is an estranged partner, or a relative 
aged 60 or over or under 18, or who is incapacitated.23 A ‘relative’ for these purposes is defined 
very broadly within the statutory guidance.24 It is extremely noteworthy that these provisions 
are based on the occupation of relevant individuals alone, who need not have any entitlement 
in the home at all. 
There is a discretion to disregard the home in other circumstances,25 such as where there is a 
co-resident who is not a qualifying relative for the purposes of the mandatory disregard. Forbes 
J held that when considering whether to exercise the equivalent discretion in the pre-Care Act 
regulations,26 it was necessary to ‘maintain an appropriate balance between the exercise of that 
discretion and the need to observe the important underlying principle of the legislative scheme’, 
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namely ‘to ensure that [care home] residents with assets are not maintained at public 
expense’.27 
Cases where a relative moves into the property only after the adult has become resident in a 
care home are included in the scope of the discretionary disregard. When the Court of Appeal 
considered the pre-Act disregard relating to occupation of a care recipient’s home by family 
members in Walford v Worcestershire County Council, Underhill LJ noted that the new 
regulations ‘deal more explicitly with the issue’ than the old ones.28 There is also a 12-week 
disregard of the value of the home when the adult first enters a care home or another disregard 
ends unexpectedly because a qualifying relative dies or goes into a care home himself.29 There 
is a discretion to disregard in relation to other unexpected changes of circumstance.30 
As discussed in Section III, a deferred payment agreement is unlikely to be offered where a 
care recipient has been assessed as liable to contribute towards care costs and has relevant 
property other than the main home. This, in turn, means that where a home is disregarded, it is 
unlikely to be subject to a DPA, a state of affairs likely to benefit co-residents. There may 
nevertheless be circumstances where arrears of care fees have accumulated (perhaps at the time 
of death) and the home is sold in order to meet the debts of the estate without reference to a 
DPA or even where a home was disregarded in the initial financial assessment. The 
enforcement of debts is considered in Section IV of this chapter. 
Even if a home is not formally disregarded, the value of a non-care recipient’s share of it in 
principle should not be included in the financial assessment,31 and it may be difficult for a local 
authority to justify taking even the care recipient’s share in the home into account where 
someone else has an interest in it given that ‘[t]he [relevant] current market value will be the 
price a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller’.32 Where the property in question is land, 
the regulations quite properly disapply the general principle that where the care recipient and 
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others are beneficially entitled to capital ‘each person is to be treated as if each of them were 
entitled in possession to an equal share of the whole beneficial interest’.33 If the care recipient 
deliberately alienates part of the beneficial interest in order to avoid liability for care fees, 
however, this is likely to trigger the Care Act’s anti-avoidance provisions, which allow a local 
authority to treat her as though she still owned it (subject to the market value issue just 
considered) or to pursue the disponee for a relevant amount.34 Moreover, it will be seen in 
Section III that where the presence of a co-resident has not prevented the offering of, and entry 
into, a DPA, the notion of priority for the purposes of the DPA regulations might prejudice the 
protection apparently given to a co-resident’s share. 
This sub-section has demonstrated that there are a number of circumstances in which the sale 
of a home forced by a local authority will not in principle become a realistic prospect because 
of the existence of a co-resident. These circumstances are notably peculiar to the liability to 
pay for social care, and are advantageous to such co-residents as compared to (perhaps more 
familiar) situations involving private-sector creditors. There will nevertheless be cases where 
a home sale at the behest of a local authority would be possible and could prejudice the interests 
of a former co-resident, and the remainder of this chapter deals with these. The next section 
addresses the creation of charges on the home, a highly significant means of facilitating such 
sales. 
III. Social Care and the Creation of Charges on the Home 
A. Deferred Payment Agreements pre-2015 and Charges under the 1983 Act 
It has been seen that, aside from the cap on care costs, a major area of funding reform within 
the Care Act relates to the widespread offering of deferred payment agreements, which allow 
for the payment of social care costs to be deferred (effectively via a secured loan) until a certain 
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point, such as the death of the care recipient or the (potentially voluntary) sale of her home.35 
Despite their opposition to the cap, Hopkins and Laurie support the new principle of ‘universal 
deferred payment’.36 As discussed in more detail in the next sub-section, as well as retaining a 
discretion to offer a DPA, local authorities are prima facie obliged to do so to an adult whose 
needs are to be met in a care home, who has no more than £23,250 in assets other than any 
interest in the home and the home is not disregarded.37 This is significant because of the 
concern that people could be forced to sell their homes during their own lifetimes in order to 
pay for their care, although some have questioned the idea that people have been ‘forced’ to 
sell their homes in a real sense, and pointed to the advantages of doing so in certain situations.38 
The postponement of sale would bring short-term advantages to a co-resident even if it did not 
protect their interests in the longer term. 
In any case, Spencer-Lane notes several weaknesses in the pre-2015 DPA scheme,39 which was 
contained in the Health and Social Care Act 2001.40 There was no obligation on local 
authorities to offer DPAs, and the Impact Assessment for the Care Act reported a ‘wide 
variation in both the number of deferred payment agreements offered in local authorities and 
in the eligibility conditions attached to local schemes’, such that only around 4,000 people 
entered them each year.41 In addition, local authorities were not able to charge interest until 
after the relevant person had died. 
Moreover, some local authorities apparently preferred to use their general debt recovery powers 
under the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983 because those 
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allowed a charge to be placed on the home42 but did not require consent.43 The Court of Appeal 
in Walford was told that 
in a case where a resident owns property which is not the subject of a disregard but has no 
significant income it is standard practice for authorities to take such a charge, though they may 
choose not to seek to enforce it forthwith.44 
This ability to create a charge unilaterally was detrimental to both care recipients and co-
residents, albeit that, as the Land Registry put it, ‘[w]here the [care home] resident is a joint 
owner, the charge affects only his or her beneficial interest, not the registered legal estate’, and 
‘section 22(5) provides that the joint tenancy is not severed, but the charge will be for an 
amount not exceeding the value of the interest which the resident would enjoy if the tenancy 
were severed’.45 Section 69 of the 2014 Act, which addresses debt recovery, does not contain 
an express power to create such a charge, which is beneficial to both care recipients and co-
residents, albeit that matters may be different to the situation described by the Land Registry 
where a charge has been imposed by consent under a DPA. The Act does leave open the 
possibility of ‘alternative financial arrangements’ to DPAs, but the section providing for them 
is not in force at the time of writing.46 The details of the new DPA scheme, and its implications 
for co-residents, are considered in the next sub-section of this chapter. 
B. Deferred Payment Agreements under the Care Act 2014 
The government reported that ‘[t]he majority of respondents’ to its consultation exercise were 
‘highly supportive of the overall intention to extend the deferred payments scheme’ under the 
                                                   
42 Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, s 22. 
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2014 Act.47 The new DPA scheme is designed to be cost-neutral, such that interest rates and 
administration charges can be levied. There is a national maximum interest rate specified in a 
circular, and the guidance suggests a given local authority must use the same rate for all of its 
DPAs.48 
On particular issues, ‘some [consultation] respondents suggested that the guidance needed to 
provide further clarity around how to manage issues associated with lack of mental capacity’.49 
There were concerns about ‘people entering into deferred payment agreements … 
inappropriately when they lacked capacity, and what might happen if people lost capacity 
whilst in DPAs’.50 It was also noted that 
A number of consultees also pointed out that, given that DPAs may be relatively brief in 
length, people should be provided with statements of the amount deferred at more frequent 
intervals, and should be able to request statements as and when they were needed51 
and ‘[s]ome respondents also suggested that the guidance should be clearer that local 
authorities should signpost people to independent financial advice (including regulated 
financial advice but only where appropriate)[52] when considering taking out a DPA’.53 The 
guidance was amended to reflect all of these concerns. The guidelines on the equity limit 
(explained below) have also been simplified. While ‘the majority of respondents were 
supportive of the suggestion to incentivise rental by allowing people to retain a proportion of 
any income they generated from letting their property’,54 this will not always be feasible where 
there is a former co-resident. 
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There are nevertheless still concerns that the de facto asset threshold for the mandatory offering 
of a DPA (effectively £23,250 in the first instance, as described above) and the apparent 
likelihood that only people with slightly more than that would be offered one on a discretionary 
basis effectively prevent the scheme from being universal, although the asset threshold could 
change. The Impact Assessment asserts that ‘self-funders would not be eligible for a deferred 
payment if they had more than £23,500 [sic] in savings’,55 although it is presumably referring 
to eligibility for a mandatory DPA. While it justifies this situation on the basis that ‘[a]nyone 
above this threshold could typically afford to pay for a year of residential care out of their 
savings, without having to draw on their housing wealth’,56 it is a significant limitation that 
might risk greater use of unsuitable equity release products,57 albeit that (as discussed in 
Section II) it could facilitate the protection of the home for the benefit of a co-resident inter 
alia. 
The Impact Assessment also makes clear that ‘local authorities will be required to seek 
adequate security for a deferred payment agreement’,58 which is borne out by the Care and 
Support (Deferred Payment) Regulations,59 and such an authority can refuse to enter an 
agreement with someone who meets the general mandatory criteria if it is unable to obtain a 
first charge by way of legal mortgage over the person’s property.60 It also has a discretion to 
accept another form of security in line with a policy.61 With regard to the sort of charge 
considered acceptable ‘the majority [of consultation respondents] were opposed to local 
authorities being required to accept any legal charge, and in favour of authorities only being 
                                                   
55 Department of Health, Impact Assessment: The Care Act 2014 (n 14) [8.11]. 
56 ibid [8.11]. 
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Publishing, 2012); cf Hopkins and Laurie (n 3) 137–138. 
58 Department of Health, Impact Assessment: The Care Act 2014 (n 14) [8.46]; cf Hopkins and Laurie (n 3) 134. 
59 Care and Support (Deferred Payment) Regulations 2014, r 4(1). 
60 Care and Support (Deferred Payment) Regulations 2014, r 4; Department of Health, ‘Care and Support Statutory 
Guidance’ (n 9) [9.12]; see also Department of Health, Response to the Consultation on Draft Regulations and 
Guidance (n 47) 29; but cf Department of Health, ‘Care and Support Statutory Guidance’ (n 9) [9.62]–[9.63]. 
61 Department of Health, ‘Care and Support Statutory Guidance’ (n 9) [9.62]–[9.63]. 
  
required to accept a first charge’.62 The government noted that ‘this response was not limited 
to local authorities, and included providers, the professional services sector, and representative 
groups and voluntary organisations’, and that ‘indeed more of the latter category were opposed 
than were in favour’.63 An assumption is clearly being made that any acquisition or other 
mortgage that already burdened the property will generally have been discharged before a 
person requires care. 
The final guidance makes clear that (as seen above) there will in some circumstances be an 
obligation to make DPAs available throughout England under the Care and Support (Deferred 
Payment) Regulations 2014. An adult must be offered a DPA if her needs are to be met in a 
care home, she has no more than £23,250 in assets excluding the home and the home is not 
disregarded.64 A local authority may nevertheless offer an agreement to someone who does not 
meet these criteria, and is advised to take into account various matters, including the extent of 
the adult’s accessible assets left after meeting care costs, whether the adult wants to use the 
home to purchase top-ups to secure more expensive care and whether she misses the mandatory 
criteria only narrowly.65 
The guidance states that a local authority may refuse to enter a DPA to someone meeting the 
above criteria where it is unable to obtain a first charge, the person is seeking a top-up (in which 
case an appropriate agreement can still be offered) or the adult does not agree to the 
arrangement’s terms and conditions,66 although anecdotal evidence suggests that some local 
authorities are refusing to comply on other grounds.67 Where mandatory criteria are unsatisfied, 
the local authority may and should consider exercising its discretion to offer a DPA. 
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A local authority may refuse to defer further costs under an existing agreement (as the amount 
actually spent on care increases) where the person’s assets fall below the threshold or become 
disregarded such that the person becomes eligible for mean-tested help, the person no longer 
needs care in a care home or the person has committed a non-resolved breach of the agreement 
and the agreement permits a refusal to defer further.68 Oddly, the situation where the person no 
longer needs support in a care home appears in both the discretionary and mandatory refusal 
categories.69 
The guidance also states that a local authority should not exercise its discretion to refuse further 
deferrals where the person would be unable to pay any liability that became due as a result 
from their non-housing assets,70 but it must refuse further deferrals where a person has reached 
their ‘equity limit’, with such refusal presumably prompting immediate sale (prejudicial to 
former co-residents) in some cases. This limit on the amount that can be deferred is effectively 
determined by the amount of equity the person has in the chosen security (usually the home), 
the amount that the person is contributing towards care costs from non-housing sources, and 
the total care costs that will be faced (including top-up payments made to secure more 
expensive accommodation).71 The ‘equity limit’ will also leave some equity available to cover 
subsequent interest and variations in the value of the security.72 It is set at the value of the 
property minus 10 per cent, minus the lower capital limit for means-tested assistance (currently 
£14,250) and minus the amount by which the property is already encumbered through security 
interests ranking in priority to the local authority’s charge.73 
When calculating the amount that a person is able to contribute from other sources, the local 
authority must enable her to keep (at that person’s option) up to £144 per week as a ‘disposable 
                                                   
68 Department of Health, ‘Care and Support Statutory Guidance’ (n 9) [9.16]. 
69 ibid [9.18]. 
70 ibid [9.17]. 
71 ibid [9.35]. 
72 Care and Support (Deferred Payment) Regulations 2014, r 5(5); Department of Health, ‘Care and Support 
Statutory Guidance’ (n 9) [9.36]. 
73 Care and Support (Deferred Payment) Regulations 2014, r 5(5); Department of Health, ‘Care and Support Statutory 
Guidance’ (n 9) [9.38]. 
  
income allowance’.74 A person should in principle be able to defer all care costs (including top-
ups), but the agreement must be sustainable in an overall sense.75 
Very significantly for present purposes, the statutory guidance provides that the local authority 
must also seek consent from anyone with a legal or beneficial interest in the property when 
proposing to enter a DPA,76 which could, of course, include many of the former co-residents 
with which this chapter is concerned. This alleged obligation is not necessarily consistent with 
the regulations themselves, however, which state that consent should be obtained from a person 
‘who the authority considers has an interest in the land or other asset in respect of which a 
charge will be obtained’ and ‘whose interest the authority considers may prevent it from 
exercising a power of sale of the land or asset or recovering the deferred amount’,77 but only if 
‘the authority considers it is necessary to do so’.78 This leaves much discretion in the hands of 
the local authority, although it will be in the local authority’s interest to obtain consent. 
The relevant consent is defined in the regulations as consent that ‘in the opinion of the local 
authority is genuine and informed consent given in writing’79 to ‘the creation of a charge’; and 
‘the charge taking priority to and ranking before any interest the person [consenting] has in the 
land or other asset which will be the subject of the charge’.80 The notion of ‘priority’ is 
extremely controversial in a context where the co-resident is in principle not intended to be 
liable for the care recipient’s care in the first place. If the ‘priority’ is to have any substantive 
meaning beyond the ability to exercise a power of sale without resorting to the Trusts of Land 
and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (to be discussed in due course),81 it presumably means 
that the co-resident’s share can in principle be used to satisfy the debt where the originally 
assessed amount of the liability is greater than the amount raised by the care recipient’s share 
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on sale. The difficulties of valuing and including a care recipient’s share where a co-owner also 
has a beneficial interest must, however, be taken into account. 
If a local authority fails to gain consent from a former co-resident, it is presumably at risk of 
its charge ranking below any beneficial interest of that co-resident (provided that the interest 
is overriding82 and has not been overreached),83 and being subject to proceedings under the 
Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 if it wishes to sell the property. This 
legislation enables a court to consider a wide range of factors when deciding whether to order 
a sale (including the interests of equitable owners),84 albeit that ‘the courts tend towards 
ordering a sale on the general ground that a secured creditor should not be kept out of its money’ 
in such cases (generally involving private creditors).85 Since, by definition, the loan advanced 
under a DPA is not made by virtue of an acquisition mortgage, the principle in Paddington 
Building Society v Mendelsohn on the implied consent of an equitable co-owner in such 
circumstances cannot be directly applied.86 It may be possible to argue by analogy, however, 
that the co-resident knew that care was required, that it prima facie had to be paid for and that 
a charge on the home as part of a DPA was the only means by which this could be achieved 
without selling the home. 
The undue influence doctrine is presumably another means through which a local authority can 
lose priority to a former co-resident with a beneficial interest, specifically one who has 
purported to consent to a DPA in the face of pressure from a would-be care recipient who 
emphasises the lack of realistic alternatives.87 The local authority is likely to be put on inquiry 
in respect of such influence being exerted by a care recipient, since it is unlikely that a care 
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recipient and a co-resident would be considered to be receiving the loan for their joint benefit.88 
It may be arguable, however, that the co-resident is receiving indirect benefit for the loan, 
particularly if he is being relieved of informal caring responsibilities through the provision of 
formal social care. In any event, a would-be care recipient may be more readily considered a 
potential victim of undue influence rather than a potential perpetrator.89 
The statutory guidance on the Care Act was amended inter alia to ensure that local authorities 
‘signpost’ people to independent financial advice (including regulated financial advice) where 
appropriate before taking out a DPA.90 The facilitation of access to independent financial 
advice is included within a local authority’s information and advice-related obligations under 
section 4 of the Act, though there are concerns that the advice-related duty is a general duty 
that does not seek to ensure that advice is received and understood,91 and the focus is likely to 
be on the care recipient rather than any co-resident. 
The regulations set out fairly restrictive provisions about the terms that a DPA must contain. It 
is not clear what effect a failure to comply with these obligations might have on the validity of 
the relevant charge, particularly in light of the basic conclusiveness of the land register.92 The 
mandatory terms are described (somewhat generally) as ‘any terms, conditions and 
information, without which the adult is unable to ascertain his or her rights and obligations 
under the agreement’.93 They are expressed to include terms: ‘to make clear that the local 
authority will make advances of [the] loan to the adult in instalments and when those 
instalments will be made’;94 ‘to explain that the local authority must cease to defer amounts 
due … or advance instalments … if the adult is no longer receiving care and support in a care 
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home or [similar] or if the local authority no longer considers that the adult’s needs should be 
met by the provision of such accommodation’;95 ‘to explain any other circumstances in which 
the local authority will or may’ cease so to defer or advance;96 requiring the local authority 
every six months (or when requested) to provide a written statement of the amount necessary 
to terminate the agreement and the accrued administration and interest charges97 (in addition 
to information on the costs that may be charged);98 requiring the local authority to give 30 days’ 
notice of the date that the equity limit (which itself must be explained)99 or agreed deferral limit 
will be reached;100 to explain how the interest will compound;101 to make clear that where there 
is genuine loan its purpose ‘is to pay the costs of care and support in a care home or supported 
living accommodation … and that the adult must pay those costs as and when they fall due’;102 
describing ‘the adequate security accepted by the local authority’;103 ‘requiring the adult to 
obtain the consent of the local authority for any person to occupy the property’104 (which might 
prejudice the former co-resident, since it does not appear to exclude those who are already 
occupying the property); and ‘to explain how the adult may exercise his or her right to terminate 
the agreement’.105 This suggests that DPAs are heavily regulated, although, again, the focus of 
protection will inevitably be on the care recipient rather than any co-resident. 
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In addition, the DPA may ‘include such other terms and conditions as the local authority 
considers appropriate’.106 It is interesting that a power of sale is not expressly included amongst 
the mandatory terms, but in the case of a mortgage created by deed one will presumably be 
implied under the Law of Property Act 1925,107 unless ‘a contrary intention is … expressed in 
the mortgage deed’.108 It is clear that such a power is contemplated, moreover, by the explicit 
reference to one in the description of a person whose consent should be obtained.109 
The statutory guidance acknowledges that a DPA may be ‘regulated credit agreements to which 
the Consumer Credit Act 1974 … and Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
apply’,110 while claiming that ‘[i]t is likely that most DPAs will fall within … an exemption’.111 
It is certainly true that local authorities benefit from a wide range of exemptions relating to 
‘regulated mortgage contracts’ for the purposes of the FSMA.112 This reduces the relevance of 
the Mortgage Conduct of Business Rules (MCOB) themselves to charges possessed by local 
authorities,113 although that should be seen in the context of the regulations governing the 
content of a DPA, the general statutory provisions applicable, the statutory guidance 
concerning them and the ‘public law’ principles relevant to local authorities.114 Even second 
charges taken by local authorities were exempt from the provisions of the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974.115 
The local authority’s right to possession is not expressly mentioned in the DPA Regulations, 
but (similarly to the power of sale) in the case of legal mortgages such a right would presumably 
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be conferred by the Law of Property Act 1925.116 One local authority does indeed warn parties 
to DPAs that ‘[i]f you do not make payment when it falls due, legal proceedings may be issued 
against you for a judgment for the amount you owe and/or for possession of the Property’.117 
A purported exercise of the right to possession would trigger the Pre-Action Protocol for 
Possession Claims based on Mortgage or Home Purchase Plan Arrears in Respect of 
Residential Property (the Protocol)118 because it applies even to ‘unregulated residential 
mortgages’.119 McFarlane, Hopkins and Nield assert that the Protocol ‘reflects MCOB 13’,120 
which is significant in light of MCOB’s lack of direct applicability to local authority mortgages. 
For example, the Protocol specifies a general expectation that the lender will not ‘consider 
starting a possession claim for mortgage arrears’ where the borrower has inter alia ‘a reasonable 
expectation, providing evidence where possible, of an improvement in their financial 
circumstances in the foreseeable future (for example a new job or increased income from a 
lodger)’.121 That said, Whitehouse has asserted that ‘the potential for the … Protocol to impact 
significantly upon the behaviour of lenders prior to court action and, thereby, to assist 
borrowers in avoiding repossession, is minimal’,122 and once again the focus appears to be on 
the borrower herself rather than any co-resident. The process of enforcing the relevant debt and 
selling the home is considered in more depth in the next section. 
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IV. Enforcing Debts and Selling Homes 
This section considers the actual recovery of debts under the 2014 Act, addressed by section 
69 inter alia, and how this might impact upon the sale of the home still occupied by a former 
co-resident, whether or not a charge has previously been created as outlined in the previous 
section. The statutory guidance emphasises that debt recovery is a ‘sensitive issue’, albeit with 
particular reference to such recovery from care recipients rather than other people, including 
former co-residents.123 It also states that ‘[c]ourt action should only be considered after all other 
reasonable avenues have been exhausted’,124 and contemplates circumstances where it would 
be inappropriate to recover a debt at all.125 
One of the generally applicable statutory principles is the new well-being principle.126 This 
provides that ‘[t]he general duty of a local authority, in exercising a function under [Part 1 of 
the Act] in the case of an individual, is to promote that individual’s well-being’,127 with ‘well-
being’ defined as encompassing several elements128 and a number of matters being specified 
as mandatory relevant considerations.129 While the principle is laudable and is not limited in 
scope to the direct recipients of social care (such that it may include some co-residents),130 the 
government has admitted that it is ‘designed to set out the overarching purpose of care and 
support into which specific duties … fit, rather than require a local authority to undertake any 
particular action in … itself’.131 
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In the documentation relating to the Draft Care and Support Bill pre-dating the 2014 Act, it 
was said that the provisions in what is now section 69 ‘consolidate various powers, including 
section 45 of the National Assistance Act 1948, and sections 22–24 of the Health and Social 
Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983’,132 with section 23 applying to Scotland 
only. Section 45 covered a person who, ‘whether fraudulently or otherwise … misrepresents 
or fails to disclose any material fact’,133 causing the local authority to incur expenditure under 
Part III of that Act134 or not to recover a relevant sum,135 and allowed the local authority to 
recover the amount from the relevant person. Section 22 of the 1983 Act applied only to 
residential care, and (as we have seen) allowed the local authority to create a charge over land 
in which a person who ‘fails to pay any sum assessed as due to be paid by him for the 
accommodation’136 has a beneficial interest. In registered land, that charge was deemed by 
statute to ‘be a registrable charge taking effect as a charge by way of legal mortgage’.137 Section 
24 allowed interest to be applied to the secured sum, but only from the date of the 
accommodated person’s death. 
The new debt recovery provisions were reported to be a ‘significant area of concern’ during 
the government consultation exercise, because the draft guidance was seen to be too ‘light 
touch’.138 Whereas the powers under the Health and Social Services and Social Security 
Adjudications Act 1983 were ‘unilateral’ because the opportunity for the local authority to 
create a charge did not provide the debtor with an alternative means of payment, the guidance 
goes as far as to claim that section 69 of the 2014 Act ‘provides equal protection to both the 
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local authority and the person’,139 and the Impact Assessment claims that it ‘brings current 
practice up to the legal minimum expected in all other fields of debt recovery’.140 
Section 69 expressly provides that ‘[a]ny sum due to a local authority under [Part 1 of the Act] 
is recoverable by the authority as a debt due to it’,141 and the cost of (at least attempting) to 
recover the debt can be added to it.142 This is set out without regard to whether the care provided 
is residential. The local authority is required to offer a DPA where possible143 under the relevant 
DPA regulations,144 and can apply to court to enforce a debt only where a DPA is not possible 
or is refused by the person who owes the debt. This statutory obligation is unlikely to be 
relevant to the core situation addressed in this chapter, however, since this chapter is primarily 
concerned with cases where the amount advanced under any DPA has become due for payment 
(often because the care recipient has died) in any event. 
The Care Act has apparently doubled the length of time (from three to six years) in which a 
debt can be recovered.145 Provided that proceedings have been issued within six years, the debt 
can still be recovered, but otherwise it must be written off.146 While there is a specific power 
for the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding the time a sum is due, when it is not 
recoverable and the charging of interest,147 Halsbury’s Annotations claim that no regulations 
have been made under section 69.148 
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The statutory guidance simply states that if, after the 90-day period following death of a care 
recipient where a DPA is in place, 
a local authority concludes active steps to repay the debt are not being taken, for example if 
the sale is not progressing and a local authority has actively sought to resolve the situation (or 
the local authority concludes the executor is wilfully obstructing sale of the property), the 
local authority may enter into legal proceedings to reclaim the amount due to it 
in accordance with the general debt recovery provisions in section 69 of the Act and Annex D 
of the guidance.149 
The preference given to a charge by way of legal mortgage presumably means that the statutory 
provisions usually governing such mortgages will potentially apply to many DPAs. This would 
include, for example, the restrictions on the exercise of a power of sale if the care recipient 
were still alive under the Law of Property Act 1925,150 meaning that some interest under the 
mortgage must be in arrears and have been unpaid for two months after becoming due, three 
months must have elapsed since notice requiring payment of the mortgage money was served 
on at least one mortgagor (which may not be relevant where the care recipient has died) or 
there must have been some breach of a non-payment covenant by the mortgagor or someone 
who agreed to the mortgage. 
If the care recipient has died (as many will have done by the time a DPA comes to be enforced) 
and the former co-resident lacked a pre-existing beneficial interest in the property, the home 
would fairly routinely be sold in the context of the personal representatives’ duty to pay the 
debts of the estate.151 This would be true even if the former co-resident is prima facie entitled 
to inherit the relevant home under a will or the intestacy rules, particularly since it is thought 
that he would possess only a chose in action to compel due administration of the estate until 
that administration is complete.152 Section 35 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 
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imposes a presumption that secured debts should be paid out of the asset over which the security 
exists where it has been bequeathed by will. The section expressly provides that the rights of 
the chargee will be unaffected by the presumption,153 which means that the local authority 
would retain a power of sale contained in a DPA.154 
Such a sale also seems inevitable on death of the care recipient where the former co-resident 
did have a pre-existing proprietary interest but was bound by the local authority’s charge, 
unless the former co-resident is able to discharge the relevant debt himself and the local 
authority consents to his doing so. Where the former co-resident has a pre-existing proprietary 
interest that is not bound by the charge (for the reasons considered in Section III), he could 
presumably use the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act in an attempt to resist the 
sale.155 While the outcome of any such application would probably reflect the trend towards 
sale, it is worth noting that Mortgage Corporation v Shaire was a case where a litigant 
successfully remained in the home notwithstanding an application for sale by her deceased’s 
partner’s creditor, subject to her ability to pay interest on a loan fashioned out of the creditor’s 
equity.156 
Section 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1970 may apply where a local authority seeks 
an order for possession of the relevant home. The section allows a court to exercise its 
discretion to adjourn possession proceedings or suspend the execution of judgment for 
possession when the mortgagor is apparently ‘likely to be able within a reasonable period to 
pay any sums due under the mortgage or to remedy a default’.157 The ‘mortgagor’ is defined to 
include ‘any person deriving title under the original mortgagor or mortgagee’,158 which, in turn, 
is likely to include a person with a beneficial interest in the property who was not a party to the 
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original mortgage,159 including a spouse or civil partner with relevant home rights.160 There 
may be difficulties over whether it includes a person who lacked an interest before the care 
recipient died but was the intended inheritor of the property (inevitably subject to the rights of 
the now-deceased care recipient’s creditors), whom we have seen in all likelihood possesses 
only a chose in action to compel due administration of the estate.161 Hopkins and Nield have 
cogently criticised the lack of protection against creditors available under section 36 for those 
who lack a proprietary interest in the home,162 which may well include some former co-
residents as understood in this chapter. That said, on the facts surrounding R v Somerset County 
Council, ex p Harcombe,163 a local authority decided that it would not be reasonable to enforce 
the charge it possessed under the 1983 Act while the care recipient’s son used it as his main 
residence. Pertinent considerations were said to be the fact that the son had provided care for 
his mother at home, that he claimed to have an emotional attachment to the relevant house and 
that he was not in employment. It took the view, however, that further considerations would 
come into play on the death of the care recipient, not least the entitlement of the care recipient’s 
daughter to a share in her estate. 
Whatever the unfortunate circumstances that might arise for former co-residents where a local 
authority seeks to enforce a debt through the sale of the care recipient’s home, the general law 
means that such a co-resident is unlikely to be in any worse position than in cases involving 
another form of secured creditor. Moreover, a local authority is in principle likely to be subject 
to human rights obligations that have been rejected by the High Court in the context of purely 
private mortgage arrangements.164 The Care Act’s impact assessment admitted that the 
previous power unilaterally to create a charge under the 1983 Act (now removed) ‘could lead 
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to successful challenges under Human Rights legislation’.165 It must be noted, however, that 
even where a public body is the proprietor of a charge over a home and seeks to enforce it, it 
may be difficult for a former co-resident to argue that the interference with his Article 8 right 
to respect for his home is disproportionate.166 Even so, while it may be legally permissible as 
a matter of general mortgage law for a mortgagee to exercise its power of sale without first 
obtaining a court order for possession,167 this may not be an appropriate action for a local 
authority to take where it is opposed by a former co-resident. 
Where there is no DPA or pre-existing charge on the care recipient’s former home, a charging 
order (governed by the Charging Orders Act 1979)168 is likely to be possible in order to enforce 
the debt owed to a local authority.169 In proceedings concerning a charging order, a former co-
resident may benefit from the fact that a local authority did not initially have a security interest 
in the care recipient’s home. As Dixon notes, however, even in this context ‘there remains a 
steady preference in favour of a sale against the wishes of the innocent co-owner’.170 
V. Conclusion 
The law considered in this chapter is a relatively complex mixture of specific social care 
provisions, general public law principles and the general law of mortgages. In all likelihood, 
‘former co-residents’ of a social care recipient will generally be in a stronger position than 
former co-residents of other types of debtors when it comes to the sale of the care recipient’s 
former home, even if some of them have made contributions (in principle voluntarily) to the 
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care recipient’s care costs to increase the available standard of care. They will often benefit 
from protection before the loan arrangement is even entered through the ‘disregard’ system 
(even if they lack an entitlement relating to the home altogether), and the system is designed 
(subject to issues of ‘priority’ under a DPA) to ensure that they are not personally liable to pay 
for the care recipient’s care. This is a highly distinctive feature of the regulation of security 
interests in the social care context, since it means that the former co-resident can be heavily 
protected while the would-be mortgagor is often able to obtain substantially the same benefit 
(ie the care) regardless of whether the charge is created. 
Moreover, deferred payment agreements are relatively heavily regulated, and the status of the 
local authority as a public body in principle produces additional and justifiable safeguards, 
even if a former co-resident may find himself reliant on the benevolent exercise of discretion 
by a local authority. The removal of the local authority’s power unilaterally to create a charge 
over the home (effectively meaning that only a charging order is likely to produce a security 
interest where there is no deferred payment agreement) is also welcome. 
It may appear unfortunate for former co-residents still to be able to lose their homes, and care 
recipients relatively routinely to be deprived of their full testamentary freedom, in the manner 
facilitated even by the reformed social care system. This is particularly true if the cap on care 
costs is never implemented and the misfortune is ultimately caused by the policy choice to 
apply a means test for social care. It is noteworthy, moreover, that in an empirical study on 
public opinion surrounding the intestacy rules, ‘participants felt strongly that the family home 
should always, initially at least, go to the surviving spouse or cohabiting partner or any relative, 
friend or companion who might be made homeless by any other arrangement’.171 As I have 
argued elsewhere, however, any reduction in the resources going into the care system may 
prejudice its ability to cater for those who are genuinely unable to make a contribution towards 
their own care costs.172 
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